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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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Chief, Foreign Division H  
Chief, OAD  
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

28 December 1950

Operational

Evacuation Program: Move of TAD Plant

OBJECTIVE

1. To formulate a plan for the evacuation of the facilities and services represented by TAD in such a way as would permit continuation of operation in case of implementation of evacuation plans for HUCOM.

2. To recommend such steps as must be initiated now in preparation for evacuation.

SUMMARY

3. The only practicable evacuation plan for TAD to meet the objective as stated would be to find a new and favorable location in England; to move, install, and commence operation of all necessary equipment there to meet present German Mission and DTRA/FID requirements using the equipment now in the TAD Lab in Frankfurt. This move, taken now, would also permit TAD to plan and allow for anticipated greater and more diverse activity in case of implementation of HUCOM evacuation plans as well as to begin serving the requirements of other GSO or VLMH operations in Europe.

SITUATION

4. It will be very difficult if not impossible to effect an organized evacuation of TAD on short notice. The document intelligence files fill eight 4-drawer cabinets and four "Kardex" cases. The various sections of the laboratory all include heavy or fragile items of equipment, from printing presses to test tubes.

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5. In case of need for sudden evacuation, the plans being completed at TAD are to burn the four drawers of "sensitive" files including operational data and correspondence on work orders, then destroy all machinery as time permits, scatter and if possible burn the document intelligence files, and evacuate personnel and dependents along with the main military movement. In other words, evacuation plans at present are simply to stop all activity, wreck the equipment, and leave, with no effort or possibility to continue production or keep together the personnel as a unit.

6. Tentative plans have been considered to load certain portable photographic, reproduction, printing, and chemical equipment onto two trucks complete with power-generator trailers in the hope of re-establishing small field units for OSO and VLMIVA activities. The plans have been shelved due to the difficulties expected in moving loaded trucks, and keeping groups of personnel with dependents together in "teams" during an emergency evacuation.

7. It might be possible to place selected items of equipment into "mothball" storage in some rear area, to be assembled and activated after evacuation. This possibility also does not appear reliable due to the problems of keeping control of the movements of individual personnel during a large-scale move. Furthermore, the difficulties in "mothballing" such diversified apparatus, as would be required might make this plan prohibitive or at least as more difficult than assembling and dispatching new equipment from the U.S.

8. The remaining alternative is to take action ahead of time by moving TAD intact to a "rear" area, that is, an area expected to be held at least in the initial phase of hostile military action. This would assure uninterrupted activity and would place the unit on a more permanent footing. "Rear" areas appear to include France, North Africa, or England. The first two may present greater political or liaison problems than the last-named, and also entail longer supply routes both from Washington and to "customers" in Germany. England is closer to the continent, and the possibilities for unhampered operations there as well as for courier service to Germany are greater.

9. Once on a permanent basis in England, it will be possible to develop TAD's resources to serve the requirements of other OSO stations and areas in Europe. The same applies for VLMIVA for which such additional services as special devices or weapons could be contemplated.

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10. A move to England would have the additional advantage of permitting direct liaison with the British counterparts on document intelligence and other related matters. A sound precedent for this has been set on a smaller scale in the profitable relationship developed by TAD with ZIPPER.

11. The physical installation required in England would in general be one bomber-type airplane hanger and three or four brick out-buildings. Location at or near an airport is recommended because of the availability of services (laborers, electricians, transportation, etc.) as well as ease of communications. An airplane courier arrangement will be required to permit adequate contact with Frankfurt and Munich, also pouch and cable facilities. In addition, a safe-house or mail address in Frankfurt should be maintained to continue the current local procurement program for special papers, printing supplies, and other items uniquely available in Germany.

#### CONCLUSIONS

12. If TAD is to continue in operation in case of sudden EUCOM evacuation, it is essential that advance preparations be made.

13. The preparations that appear most feasible from TAD's point of view are the total moving of TAD from its present location near Frankfurt to an area in England and the arrangement of adequate courier message service with Germany.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Approval for preparation of a detailed plan to move TAD to England, including conferences and an on-the-spot survey in England, by TAD representatives.

B. Decision on the actual move to be made on the basis of the detailed plan to be prepared.

KARL COMMENT:

16 February 1951

Forwarded to enable Chief, FDM and Chief, OAD to note the thinking of one of the field bases regarding future planning. For information only, as any action on this recommendation should be related to the over-all planning regarding the location and organization of all elements of the German Mission.